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

United Nations

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The cover photograph shows the swearing in of the sixth United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, by the President of the 46th General Assembly, Samir S. Shihabi.(UN Photo 178967/ M. Grant)

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NGO Forum looks at arms register resolution

Four delegates who played an active role in negotiations on the arms register resolution spoke at an NGO Forum on 12 December at UN Headquarters.

Max Gevers of the Netherlands said that early negotiations between the twelve members of the European Community and Japan led to a single draft resolution which was later expanded to provide for two main pillars: data on the international transfer of arms which are specified in its annex; and information provided by UN Member States on "military holdings, procurement through national production, and relevant policies". Mr. Gevers stressed the constraint that the first set of data will place on industrialized countries, especially on the permanent members of the Security Council as the main weapons-producing States.

To help States provide the information required, he said that the expert panel which the Secretary-General set up for 1992 will: 1) provide and service a reporting matrix for Member States; 2) recommend adjustments to the list of items in the annex; and 3) consider "modalities for the early expansion of the scope of the register".

Mr. Gevers said the Conference on Disarmament (CD)is mandated by the resolution to addresss: 1) excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms, including military holdings and procurements through national production; and 2) practical means to increase openness and transparency, in general, and the transfer of high technology with military applications and weapons of mass destruction, specifically.

Francesco Cottafavi of Italy said the process of completing the register would involve study by the first panel of experts, parallel examination by the CD, examination next year by the General Assembly, work by a 1994 panel to review the whole operation and expressions of views by Member States. The UN group of experts would prepare a standardized form so that the information supplied could be put into a computer to provide comparable data. As the register would be voluntary it was important that parliaments and governments support it.

Graciela Uribe de Lozano of Colombia said that one concern expressed by all delegations was the need to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms in different regions of the world. Increasing transparency could build confidence and strengthen international peace and security. However there were certain doubts: whether it would become a suppliers' cartel discriminating against importing countries and determining which would receive arms.

Peggy Mason of Canada pointed to a trend by which important supplier States now claimed authorship of the register idea. An evolutionary process had been set up whereby the register could be expanded. Canada felt that to get a handle on excessive accumulations of weapons, it was necessary to focus not only on transfers but also on holdings and domestic procurement. Small arms which have a destabilizing effect need to be included as well as large. Including weapons of mass destruction was more doubtful because that would cut across efforts to establish an international norm against the legitimacy of these weapons.□

General Assembly resolution on a UN arms register

The question of international arms transfers was the most intensively debated and negotiated issue in the First Committee of the 1991 General Assembly. A draft resolution was initially tabled by Japan and the European Community. Expressing the hope that transparency would eventually lead to restraint in international arms transfers, the EC/Japan draft sought to establish an arms trade register at the United Nations.

While there was broad agreement that there should be such a register, there were different views on its scope. Egypt and Pakistan, in particular, wanted the register to include not only imported weapons, but also domestic production, servicing, training and stocks.

The resolution eventually passed by the General Assembly obtained 150 votes in favour with none against and two abstentions (Cuba and Iraq). This was a more favourable vote than in the First Committee where there was one negative vote (Cuba) and eight abstentions. Of these eight countries, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan and Singapore switched to "yes" in the final vote, Iraq maintained its abstention and three countries (China, Myanmar and Sudan) did not participate.

The resolution requests the Secretary-General to establish and maintain at UN Headquarters a "universal and non-discriminatory" register of international conventional arms transfers which will also include information provided by Member States on their military holdings and their procurement through national production. Initially, information on military holdings, national production and related policies will be provided as available by Member States together with their annual reports on imports and exports.

First Committee podium showing the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Chairman of the First Committee, Mr. Robert Mroziewicz (Poland), and its Secretary, Mr. Sohrab Kheradi. (UN photo 178875/M.Grant)

Technical procedures on the effective operation of the Register and on means for expanding its scope regarding further categories of equipment and data on military holdings and national production are to be further elaborated by a panel of governmental experts which is to report to the 1992 General Assembly. This panel is holding three sessions between January and June to specify the matrix for tabulating data received and to consider some of the wider questions raised by the resolution.

The register is to record activities from 1 January 1992. Member States have been requested to provide arms transfer data and their existing information on holdings and production for 1992 by April 1993. The data requested is delineated in an Annex to the resolution which calls for the number of items in the following categories of equipment imported into or exported from their territory:

– *Battle tanks* weighing at least 16.5 metric tonnes with a high muzzle velocity direct fire gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre.

– *Armoured combat vehicles* with armoured protection equipped to transport 4 or more troops, or armed with an integral weapon of at least 20 mm calibre or an anti-tank missile launcher.

– *Large calibre artillery systems* capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primary indirect fire, with a calibre of 100 mm or more.

– *Combat aircraft* armed and equipped to engage targets by using guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons.

– *Attack helicopters* equipped to employ anti-armour air-to-ground or air-to-air guided weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system.

– *Warships*, surface or submarine, with a standard displacement of 850 metric tonnes or more, armed or equipped for military use.

– *Missiles or missile systems* capable of delivering a payload to a range of at least 25 kilometres.

Information on imports and exports is to be provided on an annual basis by 30 April each year. Information on imports is to specify the supplying State. Information on exports is to specify the recipient State.

The terms "exports" and "imports" covers all forms of arms transfers under terms of grant, credit, barter or cash. The Register will be open for consultation by representatives of Member States at any time. In addition, the Secretary-General will provide annually a consolidated report to the General Assembly on the information registered.

The resolution also asks the Conference on Disarmament to address the problems related to the transfer of high technology with military applications and related to weapons of mass destruction, and to consider practical means to increase openness and transparency for these. A group of governmental experts will be convened in 1994 to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development taking account of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.□

READEX

History of the consideration of arms transfers by the UN

During the decades that there were rapid advances in the development, production and transfer of conventional weapons, little was done to negotiate on limiting transfers. Debates on the subject of arms exports and imports were usually initiated by Western industrialized countries with a few non-aligned and neutral countries expressing their concern.

Through the years, such important arms suppliers as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and Canada (and later also the Soviet Union) showed increasing interest in the question of restraining arms transfers.

At the 1965 General Assembly, Malta submitted a draft resolution to invite the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) to consider the question of transfers between States, whether by way of trade or otherwise, of arms, ammunition and implements of war, and to submit to the Assembly proposals for establishing a system of information through the United Nations. The result was a vote of 18 in favour with 19 against and 39 abstentions in the First Committee of the General Assembly.

Three years later, at the 1968 Assembly, Denmark, Iceland, Malta and Norway sponsored a draft resolution requesting the Secretary-General to ascertain positions of Governments on undertaking an obligation to register with the United Nations all trade in arms.

The United States F-18 aircraft which was exported to six countries between 1980 and 1990. (US Department of Defense photo/ Ken Hackman).

The proposal was supported by Canada which favoured the revival of the League of Nations concept of an armaments yearbook register, and by other Western States, including the United States. In the face of opposition, mainly from a number of non-aligned States, the sponsors did not press the draft resolution to a vote.

In 1976, Japan submitted a widely co-sponsored draft resolution to invite Member States to communicate their views on international arms transfers to the Secretary-General and request him to prepare a study of the subject with the assistance of governmental experts. Although Japan was willing to amend the draft to make it more acceptable to non-aligned countries, because of objections by several of them, the debate on the question was adjourned.

In the 1975 to 1977 period, the question of international arms transfers was raised in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), the successor to the ENDC. This was done mainly in the context of regional approaches to arms control. Also the United States suggested that the CCD consider principles of conduct applicable to the acquisition or transfer of conventional arms.

In 1981, at the initiative of Denmark, the General Assembly called for a UN expert "Study on Conventional Disarmament". The 1984 study reported that experience had shown that for arms transfers to receive serious consideration, all countries needed to be satisfied that the proposals were not discriminatory. The main role of the United Nations, it said, was to provide accurate information and to promote a sound understanding of the issues involved.

A number of delegations, including Australia, Belgium and Colombia, made proposals suggesting that the General Assembly consider how international arms transfers could be regulated, for example, by creating an international register.

In 1987, Italy submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution entitled "Transfer of conventional armaments" stressing the need for

measures to constrain international arms trafficking, particularly at the regional level, and requesting the Secretary-General to monitor arms trade trends and to establish a code of conduct for both suppliers and buyers. Although this resolution was withdrawn, it laid a basis for a resolution that was adopted by the 1988 General Assembly.

Earlier in 1988, at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the United States noted that from 1977 to 1981 some $128 billion worth of arms went to developing countries with the figure going up by 40% to $180 billion in the following five years, while the developing countries themselves increased their role as producers of conventional weapons.

The 1988 Assembly resolution said arms transfers deserved serious consideration due to their potential effects in areas of tension and their negative effects on the process of peaceful development. It asked the Secretary-General to carry out a study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international tranfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

This article on the history of the consideration of the issue of arms transfers by the United Nations is based on a longer article on the topic by Alessandro Corradini which is published in *Disarmament Topical Papers 3, "Transparency in International Arms Transfers"* which is available from United Nations Publications, Sales Section at 2 UN Plaza, Room 853, New York, NY, 10017, USA. (1 800 253 9646). □

UN study on promoting transparency in arms transfers

In July 1991, eighteen governmental experts appointed by the UN Secretary-General completed a two-year study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms. This was mandated by the 1988 General Assembly resolution discussed in the previous article.

The study limits "arms transfers" to the international transfers of conventional arms since weapons of mass destruction are the subject of specific international agreements. It defines arms transfers as conventional arms (including components, services, and knowledge) which are moved from the territory of one State to that of another. The concept of transparency involves systematic provision of information on specific aspects of activities in the military field.

Reviewing past and current proposals and practices to promote transparency or regulate arms transfers, the study discusses those within the United Nations and also the history of proposals outside the framework of the UN.

The latter included a proposal by the European Parliament calling for the European Commission to report yearly on arms exports by European Community member States, a resolution on arms sales and human rights by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and reference to the Esquipulas II agreement of 1987 on the cessation of all forms of military aid to irregular forces in Central America.

The study discusses the politico-military and socio-economic reasons for, and consequences of arms transfers, of both the suppliers and the recipients.

In a section on general trends, it states that international arms transfers, in constant 1988 US dollars, accounted for about $14 billion per year in the early 1960s, rising to over $35 billion in 1973 and gradually to a peak of almost $60 billion in 1984, with developing countries accounting for about 75% to 80% of all imports in the 1980s compared to about 60% to 70% in the 1960s.

Other sections discuss the relationship between arms transfers, security, arms limitation and disarmament; measures to promote transparency; the role of transparency in facilitating limitation and restriction and other measures of restraint in arms transfers.

In its conclusions and recommendations, the report states that arms transfers are a deeply entrenched phenomenon of contemporary international relations. While this flows from the sovereign right of States to acquire arms for defence, it has significant implications for national and international stability and security as well as for socio-economic development.

Finally, it concludes that a United Nations register should be set up without delay to collect, process and publish official standardized information on international arms transfers on a regular basis. It should include suppliers and recipients. It would constitute a confidence-building measure, would promote restraint in international arms transfers and would provide countries with an indication of any build-up of arms that would be manifestly excessive and destabilizing.

In May, *Study Series 24* with the text of the Study will be available from United Nations Publications, Sales Section at 2 UN Plaza, Room 853, New York, NY, 10017, USA. (1 800 253 9646).□

Two Koreas sign accords

On 31 December 1991, North Korea and South Korea announced that they had signed a "Joint Declaration for a Non-nuclear Korean Peninsula". The Declaration, which is to be ratified, would constitute a legally-binding agreement for both sides not to "test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons".

It would commit both countries to forgo possession of nuclear fuel reprocessing or uranium enrichment plants which are generally used for weapons-grade nuclear fuel production.

According to the Declaration, each side will be allowed to inspect objects in the other's territory in order to verify their de-nuclearized status. Procedures and methods for these inspections are to be worked out by a joint nuclear control committee.

In a speech in Seoul to the South Korean National Assembly on 6 January 1992, United States President Bush said that the Declaration of 31 December was a positive development. He also announced that the United States would cancel its annual joint military exercise with South Korea as a gesture of peace in return for North Korea allowing inspections of its nuclear sites.

On 7 January, South Korea cancelled the joint Korean US annual military manoeuvres after receiving indications that North Korea was ready to allow inspections of its nuclear installations.

These developments, at the turn of the year, followed a number of significant events earlier in December.

On 13 December, an Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange and Cooperation was signed by the leaders of both North Korea and South Korea. .

While the Agreement on Reconciliation does not deal with the question of mutual force reductions along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), it calls for talks over "phased reductions in armaments, including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and surprise attack capabilities".

On 18 December, the President of South Korea stated that in order to remove any obstacles to nuclear inspections of North Korea, his Government, in consultation with the United States Government, proposed to have simultaneous nuclear inspections conducted in the South, including at United States military bases in South Korea.

At the same time, President Roh Tae Woo said that he wanted to make it emphatically clear that as he spoke on 18 December, there were not "any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea".

North Korea, which became a party to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985, has completed the drafting of a standard safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, but has not yet signed it. This agreement will provide for IAEA inspections of all declared nuclear facilities in North Korea.□

Argentina and Brazil open nuclear sites

Presidents Carlos Saúl Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil were present at the Vienna headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 13 December 1991 for the signing of a comprehensive nuclear safeguards agreement. The agreement was signed by representatives of the Governments of Argentina and Brazil, by the joint Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) and by IAEA.

The bilateral ratification process to establish the ABACC was completed on 11 December. With its office in Rio, the new agency will work closely with IAEA to set up systems for keeping inventories and inspecting sites.

The safeguards agreement covers all nuclear materials and nuclear activities within the territories of Argentina and Brazil or carried out under their control elsewhere. It also provides for the application of safeguards to exports of nuclear material.

The safeguards agreement was negotiated by IAEA at the request of the Governments of Argentina and Brazil following their Foz do Iguaçú Declaration of a Common Nuclear Policy of 28 November 1990 renouncing the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Chile and Uruguay have now also endorsed the Foz do Iguaçú Declaration and have expressed interest in joining the regional safeguards system.

The agreement is compatible with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Whereas Argentina has only signed that Treaty, Brazil has signed and ratified it but has not waived the necessary conditions for it to enter into force for itself. Most of the States to which the Treaty is open have acceded to it.□

Improving IAEA safeguards

In the course of inspections carried out in Iraq by IAEA as mandated by Security Council resolution 687, it became clear that the regular IAEA inspections of declared nuclear facilities had not uncovered important weapons capabilities. IAEA has therefore intensified its efforts to improve its safeguards procedures.

Discussing ways this can be done, in his statement to the 1991 UN General Assembly, IAEA Director General Hans Blix noted the lessons arising from IAEA experience with inspections in Iraq.

The first lesson, he said, concerned the crucial importance of information. The second was the importance of an unequivocal right of inspectors to go anywhere unimpeded, and the third lesson concerned the value of powerful support when the right of access was not respected.

Thus the ability of the regular IAEA inspections under the NPT, Tlatelolco and Rarotongo Treaties to uncover possible undeclared nuclear installations and material would increase drastically if the IAEA were to be routinely provided with relevant information available to Member States, as for example the information which they obtain through satellites.

The right which exists under IAEA NPT-type safeguards agreements to perform so-called "special inspections" – might then be used to request the inspection of undeclared installations and material which it would be reasonable to believe should have been declared.

If such a request were rejected, the Board of Governors of IAEA should then be able to submit the matter to the Security Council.

September 1991 meeting of IAEA General Conference in the Hofburg in Vienna. (IAEA photo/Dieter Pawlicek)

In a 5 December 1991 statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, Dr. Blix discussed the strengthening of safeguards. He said that the rights of entry and freedom of movement which the Agency has in Iraq as a result of the Security Council's actions, had facilitated inspections.

However, he said that in his judgement the decisive factor for the findings made was the information supplied to the Agency regarding which sites and installations should be inspected. If the State itself fails to declare nuclear installations – as Iraq did – the inspectorate must learn through other sources where to look. "No inspectorate can roam the entire territory of a State in blind search of non-declared nuclear installations".

"For these reasons," he continued, "a key modification in our practices must be to use more extensively such information as we may already possess and be open to accept and critically examine information that may be offered to us from the outside".

He said that all information, both official and non- official, needed to be examined critically, but that it would be a mistake to decline the receipt of information.

Another approach to improving the effectiveness of safeguards concerned procedures for special inspections. A State might wish to take advantage of this procedure to invite IAEA to conduct such an inspection of its own facilities in order to dispel doubts that might have arisen.

The Agency has the authority, Dr. Blix stated, under its Statute and comprehensive safeguards agreements to request special inspection at non-declared sites.

When this right was activated only for declared sites in the past, this was because there was no information suggesting the use of the right for non-declared sites.

The IAEA relationship Agreement with the United Nations allows the Board to report to the Security Council any case of non-compliance with the Procedure for Special Inspections outlined in safeguards agreements.□

Cooperation for nuclear bomb disposal

In meetings in Moscow and Kiev late in December, Russian, Ukrainian and American experts began to plan for the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons.

While recent disarmament treaties have specified ways to destroy missile delivery systems, the dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads has been studied and implemented very little.

The purpose of the December meeting was to develop rules for counting, disabling and destroying nuclear warheads.

Both nuclear weapons designers and arms control experts have been involved in the joint effort.

The American delegation included arms designers and treaty experts from the Federal Center for Warhead Design at Los Alamos in New Mexico and from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The team also included former directors of the Los Alamos laboratory and of the Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico.

The meetings in Moscow and Kiev were hosted jointly by the Foreign Ministries of the USSR and Russia, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry (MAPI), and the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.

Participation was funded privately by the US based Natural Resources Defense Council and the Federation of American Scientists which have been examining ways to verify warhead dismantling for more than a year.

The meetings were the third in a series of US-Soviet technical meetings devoted to the subject of the verified destruction of nuclear warheads and a halt to the production or reuse of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

Mock contact-handled waste drums used by the US Department of Energy in their defence waste and remedial actions management programme. (US DOE photo).

The first meeting, organized in October 1990 by the Federation of American Scientists in cooperation with the Soviet Academy of Sciences resulted in the publication of a 58-page joint report.

A second meeting was held in Washington D.C. in October 1991. Its report recommended that immediate steps be taken to uniquely identify, tag, seal, and securely store all warheads subject to the recent unilateral destruction declarations of President Bush and President Gorbachev. This report was made available to members of Congress and senior policy makers in the US and Soviet Governments.

The United States Government has now pledged early financial support for related work, with the US Congress allocating $400 million in emergency funds to support the storage and destruction of nuclear arms which are in the former Soviet Republics.

One major focus of the joint scientific work on the destruction of nuclear warheads is to identify ways to verify and demonstrate that dismantling has taken place.

The experts have also considered the steps needed for destroying weapons and the final fate of the nuclear materials, including plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

Attention was also being given to arranging secure storage and dismantling the weapons prior to the destruction of their warheads.

Another major focus concerned the question of obtaining a comprehensive inventory of nuclear weapons and their locations.

One proposal advanced at the Moscow meeting was the idea of putting a unique identification tag on each nuclear weapon as well as a seal that would reveal any tampering with storage containers. Such measures would make it possible to have a clear chain of control over the custody of nuclear weapons pending their destruction.

This was important because it is envisaged that there would not be resources to build new central storage facilities. Consequently, some short-range weapons might have to remain in dispersed areas for a number of years.

A number of low-tech sealing systems are available or can be developed. One sensitive technical

question raised at the meetings concerned the safety systems on the former Soviet weapons. United States nuclear arms have several mechanisms which make it possible to deactivate and disable them in the location where they are held.

It is estimated that there are 700 to 1,000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in dispersed locations in the newly independent Republics of the former Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States.

A final and central issue is what to do with nuclear materials after warheads have been taken apart. One possibility would be to hold the material in well-guarded storage areas under international supervision. It has also been suggested that the United States consider buying the uranium reactor fuel to prevent it from flooding the commercial market for nuclear fuel.

Another possibility would be to destroy retired warheads by incinerating them in nuclear blasts deep beneath the ground. A Moscow-based trading company which is studying this option has stated that as many as 5,000 nuclear warhead cores could be destroyed in a single underground blast.

It has been suggested that highly enriched uranium-235 could be diluted with natural uranium and processed for use in commercial nuclear power plants. It is generally agreed that highly enriched uranium could be fabricated into submarine reactor fuel or converted to oxide form and diluted to low-enriched fuel for use in civilian reactors.

Processing plutonium in such a way is considered less attractive because most countries have avoided using reactor fuels that contain plutonium.□



Exterior view of United States National Laboratory's experimental breeder reactor II at Argonne-West, Idaho Falls (Photo 297 046 001,US Department of Energy)

CIS nuclear experts seek new roles

Scientific and technical experts in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the former Soviet Union are seeking new roles for themselves and their nuclear weapons laboratories.

Cities and factories that were rarely identified by name or location are now coming into public view because the people working there want to develop joint ventures with nuclear experts elsewhere.

The scale of the nuclear production and research capacity is enormous.

It is estimated that the complex of cities and plants and labs that have designed and produced the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union is several times larger than the comparable United States complex which employs nearly 100,000 people in 13 states at the cost of some $11 billion per year.

A recent US Government report estimated that the nuclear arms industry in the Soviet Union employed some 900,000 people in the late 1990s, including blue-collar workers and military personnel guarding sites.

One area of service being offered by CIS scientists and technicians relates to the need for environmental clean-up, both to destroy weapons safely and to deal with certain by-products of arms production. Some scientists have proposed the use of peaceful nuclear explosions for the bulk incineration of chemical weapons and other toxic wastes.

A group of Soviet scientists who discussed joint research in 1990 with US scientists in California addressed the question of what to do with nuclear materials from dismantled warheads, how to conduct ecologically clean blasts in closed chambers and how to make fuels for laser fusion.□

Peacekeeping and disarmament

Plans for disarmament in Cambodia

On 30 December, the Cambodian Supreme National Council appealed to the United Nations to speed the deployment of a large peace-keeping force.

The SNC which is chaired by Prince Sihanouk includes representatives of the various factions that had fought for 12 years in Cambodia: officials of the Government of Prime Minister Hun Sen, and representatives of three other groups, including Mr. Khieu Samphan of the Khmer Rouge.

The parties agreed on the text of a request to the UN seeking an immediate deployment of the forces that are to disarm the factions and take over much of the interim process of government.

The first part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had arrived in Phnom Penh on 24 November 1991 to begin to implement the peace plans adopted on 23 October at the Paris Conference on Cambodia.

The initial mission is to assist the parties to the Paris Accords maintain their cease-fire. Consisting mainly of military liaison officers it is there to help the parties address and resolve any violations or alleged violations of the cease-fire. It also provides for the first stage of the good offices mechanism foreseen in the Accords.

The Paris Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict were signed by Cambodia (represented by four groups) and 18 other UN Member States. Annexes provide a mandate for UNTAC.

UNTAC will have the following operational components: military; civil police; civil administration; election; human rights; repatriation; and rehabilitation and reconstruction. Its headquarters will be located at Phnom Penh. Full deployment of the mission will involve the posting of UN staff at the provincial and sub-provincial levels.

UNTAC will supervise the cease-fire and the cessation of outside military assistance and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces. It will also be responsible for the regroupment and cantonment of all of the armed forces of the Cambodian parties and will ensure a 70% level of disarmament and demobilization.

In addition, it will help to detect and clear minefields, which represent a daily danger for the civilian population and a barrier to the resumption of all normal economic activity.

The role assigned to the United Nations by the Paris Accords will make the Organization responsible for an operation that will probably be the largest and most complex in its history.

In addition to disarmament functions, the United Nations will be responsible for controlling or supervising, in varying degrees, the activities of the existing administrative structures, including the police, and for ensuring promotion of and respect for human rights, so that the Cambodian people will not again be exposed to the grave abuses of the past.

The primary goal of these various measures is to encourage the establishment of a neutral political environment in which the Cambodian people can freely determine their future within the framework of democratic elections organized and conducted by the United Nations.

It will also be necessary to ensure the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons so that they may take part in the elections. The repatriation is to be undertaken in conformity with the principles outlined in the Paris Accords and in circumstances ensuring security and dignity.

At the same time the United Nations will develop and coordinate an international programme for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country.

The week after the Paris Accords were signed, on 31 October, the Security Council called upon all Cambodian parties to comply fully with the cease-fire agreement that had come into effect on 23 October.

The Security Council noted that the Agreements provided for the establishment of UNTAC and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report with his plan for implementing the mandate envisaged in the Agreements.

On 9 January 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali appointed Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who has served as UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs since 1987, as his Special Representative on Cambodia.□

Peace efforts in Central America

As the final moments of Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's term of office came to a close on 31 December 1991, the Government of El Salvador and the leaders of the Farabundo Martí national liberation front (FMLN) signed a ceasefire agreement. Designed to come into effect on 1 February 1992, the agreement will end 12 years of armed conflict.

This development followed an Agreement (generally referred as the New York Agreement) concluded at United Nations Headquarters on 25 September between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN which specifies a number of principles for peace and disarmament in El Salvador.

Among the measures called for by the Agreement is the creation of a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz) (COPAZ), which will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of all the political agreements reached by the parties.

The Agreement states that COPAZ will have the power to prepare preliminary legislative drafts redefining the doctrine of the armed forces.

This redefinition is to be based on the principle that the activities of the armed forces must be consistent with the concept of a legally-constituted State governed by the rule of law, the primacy of the dignity of the human person and the subordination of the armed services to the constitutional authorities.

The Agreement states that military training will include an emphasis on the pre-eminence of human dignity and democratic values and respect for human rights. The size and the budget of the armed forces in peacetime and the timetable for their reduction will still have to be negotiated.

Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar presiding over the signing of the New York Agreement of 25 September 1991 between the FMLN and the Government of El Salvador. (UN Photo 178192/J. Bu)

At the end of September, the Security Council welcomed and supported the New York Agreement urging both sides to exercise maximum restraint, particularly with respect to the civilian population.

In a report of 28 October to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that large quantities of weapons were in private hands or hidden in various parts of Central America and readily available to members of irregular forces.

He reported that the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) had confirmed that the Central American countries that are neighbours to El Slavador were adopting measures, "albeit with varying degrees of vigour," to prevent activities from their territories that would violate the Esquipulas II Agreements.

Under the Esquipulas II Agreements of August 1987 and later negotiations of November 1990 a Central American Security Commission was established to pursue negotiations on security, verification, and the control and limitation of armaments in Central America.

The Commission is composed of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. A Technical Sub-Commission has been working on elements for a reasonable, proportionate balance of forces in the region. The Security Commission has in principle approved a proposal for a model to account for and monitor the levels and inventories of military installations, equipment and armaments in Central America, but unresolved internal conflict in two of the five countries has delayed further progress in this area.□

Declaration of Cartagena

On 4 December, the Heads of State of the Andean countries adopted a Declaration on the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction which they signed at Cartagena, Colombia. The Declaration was signed by representatives of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

The Declaration welcomes the initiative of the Government of Peru concerning the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in Latin America and the Caribbean as the start of a gradual process for strengthening security and mutual confidence in the region.

It expresses the commitment of the five Governments to renounce the possession, production, development, use, testing and transfer of all weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, bacteriological, toxin or chemical.

It reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of the five countries to take advantage of scientific and technical developments exclusively for peaceful uses in the field of nuclear energy, biology and the chemical industry, and to accede to the use of space technologies.

It calls on the countries which have technology for the production of weapons of mass destruction to strengthen the systems for controlling the transfer of such technologies.

It asks the countries with weapons of mass destruction to undertake not to use them or to threaten the Parties to the present Declaration with their use.

It announces the intention of the Parties to be founding signatories to the convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The Parties support the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972 and the negotiations to strengthen its verification machinery.

They declare their willingness to promote the transformation of Latin America and the Caribbean into the first inhabited area of the world free from weapons of mass destruction.

They state that the responsibility for prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for halting the arms race lies with the international community as a whole, but particularly with those who possess nuclear weapons.

They consider prompt discontinuance of nuclear tests of all types to be the best means of putting an end to the increasing sophistication of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons.

And finally, they appeal to the other Governments of the region to accede to the present Declaration, and to the entire international community, in general, to support the objectives and purposes enunciated therein and to refrain from any action which might weaken the spirit of the Declaration.□

Verification database bibliography

On 27 November, the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament presented a 250 page book to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs. Entitled "Bibliography on Arms Control Verification: 1962-1991", it lists alphabetically by author over 1,500 documents related to verification. These documents include publications and submissions of governments and international organizations as well as the academic literature on the subject.

The bibliography has been developed to facilitate research on arms control and disarmament verification issues. General verification literature in the English language published from 1962 to the summer of 1991 is covered. The focus is on the substantive discussion of matters related to verification – documents which propose, discuss, explain, evaluate or otherwise comment in a detailed fashion upon verification processes, procedures or systems. More transitory materials such as documents which summarize the current state of negotiations have been omitted.

Other topics covered in the bibliography, because of their focus on matters related to arms control verification, are confidence-building, peacekeeping and compliance.

Each document in the bibliography has been assigned a number and several subject keywords relating to its contents. A thesaurus of these keywords is included in the book. Access to specific documents is facilitated by the use of an index which lists the numbers of all the documents which can be categorized under each of the keywords. □

German plans to cut defence spending

Germany is planning to reduce its military spending by almost DM44 billion (about $ 28 billion) over the next 13 years.

Announcing these plans on 11 January, German Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg stated that this would be the largest reduction in expenditures in the history of the armed forces of the Federal Republic. The 1992 defence budget is DM 52 billion (about $ 33 billion).

At the same time, Germany will build up a rapid reaction force for international emergencies to be ready by 1995. It is expected to consist of seven full army brigades, reinforced by several air force squadrons and by naval personnel.

Mr. Stoltenberg said the switch in focus to highly mobile military forces was in line with the NATO strategy adopted last year.

The cuts in force levels will reduce the number of military personnel from 454,000 to 370,000 by the end of 1993.

Although the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is the correct formal name of the united country, limits deployment of forces to the territory of NATO countries, amendment is being considered to allow German forces to take part in international actions under the aegis of the United Nations. □

French 1992 defence spending

Late in 1991 the French Government put forward a defence budget for 1992 that reduces troop strength, increases the investment in space technologies and provides for an overall decrease in expenditures compared with 1991 when adjusted for inflation.

The French army, which numbers 280,000 troops will be reduced over the next six years to 225,000. The total 1992 defence budget of 240.6 billion francs ($42.2 billion) is about 2 per cent lower than that for 1991. This represents 3.26% of Gross Domestic Product for 1992 as compared to 3.4% in 1991.

Defence Minister Pierre Joxe said the end of the cold war and the collapse of communism argued for a lower defence budget. He stressed the need to turn the armed services into a high-technology force with a range of space-based assets at its disposal. The ministry would increase funding on space programmes by 18% in 1992 to more than 3.5 billion francs with further increases for the coming years Mr. Joxe stated.□

US to cut nuclear weapons production

In December 1991, the United States announced plans to reduce its nuclear weapons productions plants to four with one test site in Nevada. Weapons plants in Florida and in Ohio are scheduled for closure as is the production of nuclear weapons material at the Rocky flats plant near Denver, Colorado.

An industry that once produced 5,000 to 6,000 nuclear warheads a year will, by 1996, be mainly responsible for maintaining shrinking stockpiles and cleaning up the pollution it produced.

Because of these remaining tasks it is expected that total employment in the US nuclear weapons industry will remain near the current level of 57,000 employees. However the balance of work is expected to shift, as will budgetary allocations; so that approximately half the people and half the money will be devoted to environmental cleanup.

The Energy Department's budget for the nuclear weapons industry is now about $12.3 billion per year. The plan is to cut annual costs by $140 million from what would have been spent if the plants had stayed open.□

US considers further defence cuts

The United States is considering further cuts in its defence budget for 1993. The US defence budget for 1992 is $291 billion. US economists have estimated that the military and its suppliers account for about 5% of the United States Gross Domestic Product of $5.5 trillion.

New cuts would be additional to the 25% reduction in the size of the armed forces scheduled to take place between 1990 and 1996 which the Department of Defense announced in 1990. Under this plan, the US Army is due to shrink from 18 to 12 active divisions and the Air Force from 36 to 26 aircraft carrier battle groups by the mid-1990s.□

Update on inspection of weapons in Iraq

Six months after the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was established, a comprehensive report dated 25 October was submitted to the Security Council summarizing the operational activities of the Special Commission and IAEA in their inspections of the military capacity of Iraq in the chemical, biological, ballistic missile and nuclear fields.

A second document, a letter of 4 December to the Secretary-General from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission updated the report of 25 October. The subsequent report to the Security Council is to be released late in January.

The Special Commission was established in accordance with section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and their production facilities, and to ensure that these weapons are not acquired in the future.

The resolution foresaw a first inspection and survey phase, a second phase concerned with the disposal of weapons of mass destruction and their facilities, and a third long-term monitoring phase.

By the end of December 1991, the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had fielded 24 inspections in Iraq, to provide information on Iraq's capabilities and facilities in the areas of concern. Fifteen of these missions dealt with biological, chemical and ballistic missile capacities. Another nine inspections were nuclear inspection missions undertaken by IAEA with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission.



Iraqi truck containing nuclear equipment under inspection by a United Nations team. (UN Photo 158482/UN Inspection Team Doc. 0047P)

Nuclear inspections

In the nuclear field the inspection teams went to a number of sites associated with Iraq's programme to design and develop these weapons. The reports say that conclusive evidence has been obtained that Iraq was able to separate plutonium and enriched uranium and that it had a development programme for an implosion-type nuclear weapon.

The Iraqis have declared both irradiated and unirraded material. The unirradiated material has already been removed to the Russian Federation. The irradiated fuel will be removed at a later date.

As regards fissile material production, much of the electromagnetic isotope separation equipment has been collected at a central location.

Chemical inspections

Chemical inspections have provided information from which it seems probable that a full assessment of Iraq's chemical weapon capabilities will be achieved. Iraq's facilities include a major complex at the Al Muthanna State Establishment for the activities of research, development, production and munition filling.

Iraq has acknowledged that it had 46,000 pieces of filled munition, mostly artillery shells, rockets and bombs which were found to have been stored at various sites throughout the country. In Al Muthanna, designated as the central destruction site for chemical weapons, destruction of filled munitions is to begin in Spring1992, and is expected to continue into 1993.

A number of munitions filled with tear gas, were destroyed by coalition bombing. Most of the remainder, many of which are damaged, comprise munitions filled with mustard agent or sarin.

Inspecting the Al Muthanna site, inspection teams discovered three kinds of nerve agents. Although the quantities found are believed to be of no direct military significance, the relevance lies in the fact that Iraq had carried out research on nerve agents other than those it declared.

Under the supervision of UNSCOM inspectors, Iraqi personnel have destroyed almost 12,000 unfilled chemical munitions, consisting of six different varieties of bombs, artillery shells and rocket warheads. They were destroyed either by crushing the munitions with a bulldozer or by cutting them with an oxyacetylene torch.

Biological inspections

As regards biological weapons, evidence has been collected showing that Iraq was engaged in a military biological research programme. Iraqi officials have admitted that they carried out a programme of biological research fordefensive military purposes.

While Iraq said that this research programme had started in mid-1986 and ended with the destruction of all stocks in August 1990, the UN inspection team was later given samples of biological stocks containing micro-organisms which are generally considered to be biological warfare agents.No evidence of weaponization was found.

The biological inspection programme has been carried out at more than 11 sites. It provides a data base for future monitoring of biological capabilities in Iraq.

Missile inspections

With respect to ballistic missiles with a range of 150 kilometres or more, inspection teams have supervised the destruction of 62 ballistic missiles, 18 fixed Scud missile launching pads, 33 ballistic missile warheads, 127 missile storage support racks, rocket fuel, an assembled 350mm supergun, components of two 350mm and two 1,000mm superguns, and one tonne of supergun propellant. Several missile repair and production facilities were found to have been destroyed by coalition bombing.

From 1 to 9 December a ballistic missile inspection team of 11 UN inspectors from 10 countries went to Iraq. The team inspected 17 sites, of which 7 had not been declared by Iraq. Some hydraulic buffers and 22 barrel sections, components of the 1,000mm supergun, were found undestroyed. In addition two trailers used for transporting Al Hussein and Scud missiles, that had been previously demolished, were found to have been welded together. The trailers have been out fitted to carry shorter-range Frog-7 missiles, which are not mandated to be destroyed under the terms of the Security Council resolution.

The inspection team has asked the Iraqi Army personnel to destroy the material found, as well as an additional six unaltered trailers.

Assessment and plans

Assessing the activities of the Special Commission and IAEA, the reports point to their high degree of effectiveness, particularly considering that there was no precedent for the Commission's work . The activities undertaken have resulted in a situation where, regarding chemical and biological weapons capacities, a comprehensive data base will be available shortly. Concerning ballistic missiles, a comprehensive data base is also within reach, although further inspections might be required to ensure a complete disclosure of remaining ballistic missiles by Iraq. In the nuclear field a complete disclosure of nuclear weapons programmes still needs to be made.

Establishing a comprehensive data base is being pressed forward with vigour, as it is necessary for the implementation of the monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 and with respect to IAEA and UNSCOM plans.

The Special Commission is now in the process of completing its analysis of the material and documents obtained in Iraq and is setting up procedures for the long-term monitoring of Iraqi compliance in cooperation with IAEA.□

UNSCOM team members on chemical weapons in Iraq inspect mustard agent 155mm artillery projectiles that were damaged by fire at the Fallujah Chemical Proving Ground (UN Photo 158633/Shankar Kunhambu)

NGO news items

The brief report below on activities of non-governmental organizations includes some of the events and programmes which have come to the attention of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. The coverage does not imply any judgement by the United Nations.

Student Pugwash USA will assemble ninety students from around the world for a week-long conference on the impact of science and technology on society. The 1992 Biennial Conference will be held from 14-20 June at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. Topics that will be addressed in small working groups include changing dynamics of peace and global security, and educating for the socially responsible use of technology. Undergraduate, graduate, and professional students in all disciplines are eligible to apply. Participants will be chosen through a competitive, merit-based process and all on-site costs will be covered by Student Pugwash USA. The organizers strive for international, intergenerational and interdisciplinary representation. **Contact:** Conference Coordinator, Student Pugwash USA, 1638 R Street NW, Suite 32, Washington, D.C. 20009, USA. (Tel: 1 202 328 6555)

The Regional Strategic Studies Programme Institute of Southeast Asian Studies held the first Asia Pacific Defence Conference from 26-28 February 1992. Topics include major powers and emerging regional powers, trends in defence technology in Asia-Pacific and lessons to be learned from the Gulf war. **Contact**: Times Conferences, Times Centre, 1 New Industrial Road, Singapore 1953. (Tel:65 284 8844, Fax:65 286 5754) 5754)

The Fifth "Peace Wave", from 24 to 30 October 1991, covered all five continents and the Pacific Islands with activities in 52 countries. The aim of the action in 1991 was to build a movement of the world's anti-nuclear peace groups in support of an international agreement for the banning and elimination of nuclear arms, to make positive use of the current period of change in world military blocs. **Contact**: Peace Wave Action Committee, 6-19-23, Shimbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, Japan. (Tel: 81 03 3431 1014, Fax: 81 03 3431 8781)

GRIP (Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix), the Centrum voor Polemologie and the Information Network on CBW (INOC) of the UK organized an international colloquium on "The Second Gulf War and the Chemical and Biological Threat" on 29 and 30 November 1991 at the auditorium of the Free University in Brussels. The meeting was also supported by UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) and by the Centre d'Etude des relations internationales et stratégiques at the University. Among the topics addressed by the expert panellists were, the use by Iraq of chemical weapons during the first Gulf war, the chemical weapons threat during the second Gulf war, the impact of the Gulf war on the politics of non-proliferation of chemical weapons and the impact of the Gulf war on the negotiations of chemical and biological disarmament. **Contact**: GRIP, rue Van Hoorde, 33, B-1030 Brussels (Tel: 32 2 241 84 20 or 80 96, Fax: 32 2 641 245 19 33)

The NGO Committee on Disarmament held two public forums on international arms transfers. The article on page 2 reports on the one held on 12 December, and the Forum of 31 October was described briefly on the back page of the December 1991 Newsletter. Transcripts of the presentations and discussions at both meetings are available. **Contact**: NGO Committee on Disarmament, 777 UN Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017, USA (Tel: 1 212 687 5340)

The International Peace Research Association (IPRA) will hold its 1992 conference in Kyoto, Japan from 26-31 July. Topics include challenges of a changing global order, peace education in the 90's, a study on militancy and terrorism and a project on ecological and cooperative education. **Contact:** IPRA Conference Secretariat, Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, Toji-in, Kitamachi, Kita-ku, Kyoto 603 Japan, (Tel: 81 75 465 8244, Fax: 81 75 465 8245)

The Center for the Study of the Global South at The American University organized a symposium on Superpower Disarmament and the Global South: Arms Transfer and Development on 4 December 1991. Speakers included Mr. Yasushi Akashi, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Antoine Blanca, UN Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation, and Ambassador Anders Thunborg of Sweden. For a report, **Contact**: Dr. Clovis Maksoud, Director, Center for the Study of the Global South, School of International Service, The American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N/W/, Washington, D.C. 20016 (Tel: 1 202 885 1600, Fax: 1 202 885 1186)